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Introduction and Acknowledgements
It is my great honor to present the first paper in our joint and annual
Financial Law Workshop. I am most grateful to Party Secretary Wang Houji, Deans
Ji Wedong and David Levi, and the many Shanghai organizations both within and
beyond Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Convenors Professors Yang Li and Paul
Haagen, and to both the Duke and KoGuan Law Schools for sponsoring and hosting
the event. I look forward to many similar events in the future, all designed to
enhance the mutual understanding and exchange of ideas between the financial
lawyers of our two nations.
Today I will talk about the growth of the extraterritorial impacts of United
States financial reform legislation, and its regulation and enforcement.

This

development is being mirrored elsewhere, in markets such as the European Union
and even Asia. It seems to be symptomatic of an increasingly complex and emerging
new world order in which the traditional concepts of state sovereignty no longer
shape the forms of global finance or the regimes and boundaries of international
financial regulation.
Examples of Extraterritoriality
The laws and regulatory systems of individual nations are usually intended
to have domestic impact only and not have application to personal or business
activities in other countries. Except when exercising sovereign claims, nations
usually do not presume to legislate in ways that will interfere with how the laws and
regulatory systems of other nations will apply in those other jurisdictions.
Recent financial reforms and regulatory actions in the United States,
however, have been far-reaching and well noticed by foreign bankers and
governments.

This is because many of these reforms have had a direct and

immediate impact on the activities and status of foreign banks, well beyond the
borders of the United States. I should emphasize that the United States is not alone
in developing and implementing financial laws and regulations that are threatening
to have extraterritorial impact: Europe, for example, has also imposed financial
2

regulations that have extensive extraterritorial impact, particularly but not only in
the field of derivatives regulation. China, for example, has imposed restrictions or
prohibitions on such global developments as Bitcoin, as have many other countries.
We will likely see more unilateral actions from many regions in the global financial
system because a variety of changes in the nature of the global financial
marketplace, driven by technology in particular, make these actions inevitable.
Before describing some examples, let me be more precise about the kinds of
rules and regulation that will have extraterritorial effect. There are three primary
categories:
1. Where Nation A imposes rules on its own Bank X (headquartered in in Nation
A) and these rules or regulatory actions constrain the operations of Bank X in
other countries even though the laws of those countries would otherwise
permit the activities.
2. Where Nation A imposes constraints upon Bank Y. Bank Y is headquartered
in Nation B but operates on an integrated basis in Nation A. Nation A’s
constraints are more restrictive than would otherwise be allowed to Bank Y
by Nation B.
3. Where Nation A imposes sanctions on Bank Y even though Bank Y’s offending
activities really took place outside the borders of Nation A. Nation A is able
to enforce these sanctions by penalizing Bank Y directly within its borders—
perhaps because Bank Y has no option but to conduct activities through
channels governed by Nation A.
In the United States all three types of extraterritoriality have been imposed.
Type One
Volcker Rule
First, the Dodd-Frank Act has imposed numerous restrictions on American
banks, even in their foreign operations. In the past, US banks were generally
permitted by US regulators to undertake whatever activities were allowed by the
3

host nation when operating on foreign soil.

The much debated Volcker Rule

provides one of the most well known examples of this new extraterritorial reach
because it prohibits US banks, irrespective of their foreign structures, from being
affiliated with firms that are engaged in proprietary trading, or holding significant
investments in hedge funds and private equity investments. There are numerous
exceptions, but the Volcker Rule is having a profound effect on the way US banks
and foreign banking organizations (FBOs) that engage with US banks can operate.
Derivatives Reform
The reforms in Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, which has made a major
change to the way in which derivatives swaps transactions must be conducted,
provide another set of examples of US legislation and regulation that has a global
reach.
Type Two
Volcker Rule Illustration
The Volcker Rule also provides an illustration of the second type of
extraterritoriality to the extent that FBOs must comply with the Volcker Rule within
the United States even if they are not subject to such prohibitions in their home
countries. Such restrictions on FBOs not only relate to their activities but also to
their corporate structures and funding.

Major examples of this latter type of

extraterritoriality are the capital and leverage requirements developed by US
financial regulators in response to the 2008 Crisis, in terms of which foreign banks
are required to hold capital ratios in the United States that may, and often do, differ
quite substantially from those required of their home countries.
This restriction is particularly impactful on global banks, most of which like
to deploy their capital in a seamless fashion across the span of their global
operations without having to allocate specific amounts of capital to the US
operations. Deutsche Bank and Barclays were two global banking organizations hit
particularly hard by these restrictions and both companies have restructured their
operations in an effort to minimize this impact.

The Chinese bank, Citic, is also
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reported to be considering closing its US branches to avoid the impact of the Volcker
Rule.1
Intermediate Holding Companies (IHCs)
Perhaps one of the most clear cut examples of the second type of
extraterritorial impact of domestic law is the requirement that foreign banking
organizations of a certain size establish IHCs in the United States. This requirement
forces a change in the corporate structure of a foreign banking organization that
would otherwise prefer to conduct its operations through a single corporate entity,
say by using a branch. Banks tend to prefer the single corporate entity structure
because it enables them to leverage the entire capital structure of the company
wherever they operate, and because this structure tends to conform to the
corporate form they use in countries such as the United Kingdom (where the bank
itself resides at the top of the conglomerate organization).
The US IHC requirement is a departure from the long-established branch
structure for foreign banks operating in the US. The IHC requirement introduces the
subsidiarity principle used in many other nations, in terms of which the foreign
bank must establish a local corporate organization with separate capital, leverage
requirements, management and boards.
Type Three
The third form of extraterritoriality has assumed considerable importance in
recent months. This is enforcement action against foreign banking organizations for
violations of US law, even when the transactions in question have really only had
effect abroad. The US, like other nations and regions, is able to enforce its policies
on an extraterritorial basis by using financial networks as a means of controlling the
flow of global finance.
Major examples are the actions by New York state and federal banking
agencies against HSBC, Barclays and BNP Paribas for anti-money laundering
See Henny Sender, Citic may give up US bank branches, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 30, 2014,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c7d389d8-0062-11e4-8aaf-00144feab7de.html.
1
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violations, actions by the United States Treasury and Justice Department against
Credit Suisse and UBS for violations of US tax laws, and actions by US banking
regulators against banking units based in London and other financial centers for
rate manipulations, such as those involving LIBOR and currency transactions.
The US authorities are able to impose, and have imposed, extensive sanctions
on these foreign operations for various reasons. First, these FBOs generally use the
payments and clearing networks in New York, and it is difficult for them to avoid
doing so. Second, many of these FBOs are affiliated in some form with banks
headquartered in the US, so the regulators have direct or indirect enforcement
jurisdiction over the foreign affiliates. Third, FBOs can be cut out of business with
US-headquartered banks and this they can ill afford.
Essentially, in this third category of extraterritoriality, the US is exercising its
market power, either directly (by forcing US banks to conform) or indirectly (by
denying FBOs access to US facilities), and over the vigorous protests of other
governments.2
Changes in the Underlying Global Financial Marketplace
Extraterritoriality Elsewhere
Of course these extraterritorial actions have been met with protests,
sometimes from US banks fearing retaliation but more often from foreign banks and
foreign governments. Yet US extraterritoriality is not unique by any means: such
forms of extraterritorial action are being taken by many nations. China, for example
and like many other countries, imposes restrictions on FBO entry and activities that
differ from those permitted in the United States.3 The European Union and many of
its member nations have imposed extraterritorial requirements on banking
operations passing through Europe.4 Many nations around the world impose some

See. e.g., Michael Sothard, Hugh Carnegy, & Martin Arnold, France urges G20 to put issue of US bank
fines on agenda, FIN. TIMES Aug. 3, 2014, at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/da428604-1963-11e49745-00144feabdc0.html.
3 HE WEI PING, BANKING REGULATION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS ch. 4 (2014).
4 See, e.g., Alexandria Carr, The Extraterritorial Effect of the EU Regulation of OTC Derivatives, HARV. L.
SCH. FOR. CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG., Jun. 14, 2014,
2
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form of subsidiarity on FBOs entering their jurisdictions, whether this is a certain
percentage of local ownership or mandatory domestic incorporation.5 So threats of
retaliation through unilateral action raise the specter of trade wars in the very heart
of international trade, namely the enabling tracks of international finance
themselves.
A New Balkanization?
At the same time, and partly influenced by these developments, concerns of a
new “Balkanization” of the global financial system are often raised. To some extent
these concerns are also a reaction against the supposedly far-reaching impacts of
the Basel III standards and the actions promoted by the G20 and the Financial
Stability Board.

Unilateral action that diverges from supposed international

consensus is evident. While regulators in the US have imposed standards that are
perhaps tougher than those contained in Basel III, many legislators who oppose to
tough regulation or who have very different views on how banks should be
regulated have actually tried to forbid the implementation of Basel III altogether.
Bank regulation, even in this day and age, has often turned out to depend much
more on domestic politics—and domestic knowledge and expertise6—than on
global accords, and in this respect the US appears to be no exception.
Whither the Seamless World of Global Finance?
Do these unilateral actions suggest an end to the possibility of a seamless
world of global finance? I believe that such a vision was never realistic in the first
place. In my view we will continue to see a much more complex picture emerge, one

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/06/14/the-extraterritorial-effect-of-the-eu-regulationof-otc-derivatives-2/.
5 See, e.g., Rob Blackwell, Three Threats to US Banks from BNP Paribas Fine, AM. BANKER, Jun. 30, 2014,
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_125/three-threats-to-us-banks-from-bnp-paribasfine-1068374-1.html.
6 See, e.g., Editorial, Does financial regulation have to be global?, THE BANKER, July 28, 2014 (“The drive
for global regulation should not lose sight of the fact that there is no regulatory substitute for
detailed local knowledge”)at http://www.thebanker.com/Comment/Does-financial-regulation-haveto-be-global.
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in which we will see a fluctuating blend of international cooperation and unilateral
acts by national regulators. Life for global banks will be difficult!
This view might seem counterintuitive in an age of global universal banks:
these institutions provide and rely upon instantaneous digital flows or currency,
derivatives transactions and general global transactions services. This is an era
declared to be the “end of geography.”7
Nevertheless, I doubt that we will see full harmonization of global financial
regulation, at least in a form that would eliminate complaints about unilateral,
extraterritorial action. The reason is that the traditional models of private banks,
public sovereigns, and a line between international and national action, have lost
much of their coherence. The lines have become very blurred. Instead, global
financial markets have become host to a tangle of governments, business
organizations and consumers of global finance in which the parties to financial
activity are partners, collaborators and adversaries—all at the same time.
Collaboration, Competition and Conflict
Pre-Crisis Progress
For the past century and a half, we have assumed that nations would develop
their own laws and regulatory frameworks, which they would apply to financial
institutions operating within their borders. Various developments made this model
more complicated. For example, in the United States the dual banking system
allowed states to make their own rules for banks, and many let foreign banks branch
directly within their borders. Claims for competitive parity let both to a federal
version of the same thing and restrictions to be imposed on FBOs that would more
or less equalize the constraints of both foreign and domestic banks operating within
the borders of the United States.
With the development of transnational regulatory coordination through the
mechanism of the Basel Committee on Financial Supervision, the concepts of mutual

7
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recognition and reciprocity began to emerge during the 1980s.8 The principle of
mutual recognition was recognized, at least implicitly, in the US where FBOs actually
enjoyed exceptional treatment in some respects. For example, activities of FBOs
that were not permitted to domestic banks were grandfathered in for their
operations in the US. A little later, they would also not be subjected to direct US
supervision if they enjoyed consolidated and comprehensive supervision in their
home countries. 9 Banks encouraged this approach because it reduced their
regulatory burdens, led to reciprocal treatment for US banks operating abroad, and
because the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision strongly encouraged such
reciprocity.
An even further reaching example was that of the European Union. There the
Union developed the concept of the “single banking passport” that enabled a bank
headquartered in one member nation to “export” its full license to operate
throughout the Union, irrespective of the restrictions that might otherwise apply in
host nations.10
As we drifted toward 2008 it looked increasingly likely that these ideas
would spread across the globe. Indeed, by 2007 more than a hundred nations had
adopted some version of the Basel agreements. The International Monetary Fund
and World Bank for Reconstruction and Development launched a peer review
program as part of an overall effort to minimum common standards of bank
supervision across the globe. This peer review technique has since been adopted by
the Financial Stability Board and other committees involved in international
financial regulation. While a single, supranational bank regulator or worldwide
governing financial treaty were unlikely politically, they were certainly urged as an
ideal towards which to strive.
At the same time, large banks steadily took advantage of this great
“smoothening” of global financial regulation.

The largest financial institutions

developed more or less seamless operations across the globe or at least in large
See generally, e.g., Pierre Hugues-Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 56 (2011).
9 Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991.
10 European Union provisions.
8
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numbers of countries. Partly this was to provide global services for clients that had
global operations.

Partly it was in pursuit of the greater profits offered in

developing markets and the demand for large scale financial services brought about
by a so-called “financial deepening” in developing countries and by the needs
sovereign nations had to finance major development projects. The efficiencies of
American-style capital markets were welcomed across the globe. US banks that, by
reason of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act and another, less well known piece of
legislation called the McCarran-Ferguson Act, had been prohibited from affiliating
with securities and insurance companies, were released from these constraints
when the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act was passed in 1999 precisely in order to let them
compete on a global stage with the universal banks of Europe and Japan. So by 2008
large banks from all over the world were competing directly with each other in
many fields of financial services. It is no wonder that these financial institutions
welcomed the pursuit of global harmonization even as they complained about the
bureaucracy involved.
Post-Crisis
Then we had the 2008 subprime meltdown leading to what became the
Global Financial Crisis. Stunned by the systemic shocks this crisis generated, the
G20 declared its resolve to promote an aggressive agenda of global financial
harmonization with higher minimum standards than the members had hitherto
applied. For a brief moment many believed that a meaningful global coordination in
financial regulation was a genuinely attainable goal.
Yet we now seem further from that goal than ever before.

The

extraterritorial actions described earlier reflect an era of unilateralism, not
coordination or harmonization.

At the same time, bankers complain about

unreasonable regulations and threaten to move their banks in opposite directions.
And in the US, at least, government seems more involved in banking than ever
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before in history.

And even within the European Union deep divisions on bank

regulatory policy are very obvious.11
What has happened? In a nutshell the activities, interests and objectives of
both banks and governments have become more tightly intertwined than ever. As a
result, the objectives and consequences of financial activity have come to reflect the
reality of modern global relations, in which nations are not simply aligned for or
against each other but, like business itself, are engaged in a complex dance involving
part collaboration, part competition and part codependence. Within the context of
US-China and other global relations, author Noah Feldman has aptly described this
state of affairs as “cool war.”12
The Dramatic Impact of Technology
Growth of Megabanks
These developments have been greatly facilitated by the dramatic sweep of
technology. Sophisticated technology platforms, communications and applications
have enabled the growth of megabanks beyond a scale that was ever possible before
the computer revolution. These megabanks compete on a global stage, no longer as
cross-border competitors but being actually “co-located” with their foreign
competition all over the world.
Government/Bank Codependency
Furthermore, these firms are not only large enough to enlist the support of
the governments of their headquarters nations, but they have also evolved in a
relationship of codependency with those governments. In the United States, for
example, very large financial institutions are literally too big to fail (however much
this is officially denied) and they count measurably on the backing of government
when in financial danger. They, and other very large foreign banks, are primary
dealers in US Treasuries, and as such are the means by which the US government is

See, e.g., George Parker, EU banks step up opposition to new EU financial services tsar, FIN. TIMES Aug.
3, 2014, at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ee66a6ba-197c-11e4-9745-00144feabdc0.html.
12 NOAH FELDMAN, COOL WAR: THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION (2013).
11
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able to finance its $17 trillion debt.

Despite denials, the large banks enjoy

substantial implicit and explicit subsidies. Nor are these advantages confined to the
US: similar situations obtain in other countries and regions. Furthermore, the
partnership between banks and governments is manifested in other areas: for
example, these same large institutions are used by government to assist in handling
other large financial institutions when those institutions fail and are too large for
government to bail out or liquidate.
Tools of Government Policy Implementation
Technology has also opened up another avenue of government-finance
codependency: as the financial transmission belts of the global financial system,
large banks have become a convenient tool for applying and enforcing government
policy. This is evident in the tax evasion and money laundering cases mentioned
earlier. Indeed, the US Treasury has adopted a very conscious strategy for using
banks and payments systems to go after violators of US law wherever these
violators are and irrespective of whether they enjoy the protection of local laws.
The European Union appears to be developing a similar strategy. In the words of
one author, these developments have ushered in a “new era of financial warfare.”
Cyberwarfare, the direct result of technology networks, has presented yet
another frontier of government-finance collaboration. Internet security has now
become a critical issue for banks and this has created a delicate relationship
between banks and government. The earlier resistance of banks to government
protection has given way to an appeal for government assistance.13 Yet at the same
time, government relationships with businesses in this arena are fragile. Banks face
a dilemma brought sharply into relief by the Snowden revelations: to the extent
that their networks can be accessed by national security agencies, they also run the
risk of losing the trust of their customers. This conflict has broken into the open in
the case of companies like Google who, out of fear of losing customers, have

See Carter Dougherty, Banks Dreading Computer Hacks Call for Cyber War Council, BLOOMBERG Jul. 8,
2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-08/banks-dreading-computer-hacks-call-forcyber-war-council.html.
13
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announced publicly their intentions to take active measures to keep government
agencies, domestic and foreign, out of their networks. Similar unease is sure to be
felt by banks as well.
At the same time, the activities of banks across global markets are
particularly interesting for governments as they conduct and assess their
relationships with other governments. The public is also now more concerned than
ever with the activities of their banks. Both developments have inevitably drawn
banks into the political arena, where they are finding that the vision of a seamless or
at least harmonious set of regulatory rails upon which to run their global businesses
remains a distant prospect.

Such ambitions lie at the fluctuating mercies of

government policy and international strategy.
Prospects for the Future
Without some massive event, such as another global financial crisis that
might galvanize worldwide public sentiment into coordinated global action toward
genuine harmonization, this complex world of competition, conflict and
codependency seems likely to become more the norm rather than less. These
circumstances are likely to make global finance difficult to undertake.
The result is that our efforts to develop common minimum standards are, in
my view, likely to move slowly forward, but at a very unpredictable pace and with
numerous setbacks. Here are some examples of the challenges:


Many nations will impose stricter regulation than banks themselves expect.



In efforts to compete as major financial centers, governments might sometimes
even deregulate where international consensus might have suggested the
opposite tack.



Banks will find themselves both willing and unwilling instruments of the state—
the conveyor belts of government policy. This is a price they will have to pay for
their heavy codependency with their national governments.



Domestic political demands for the protection of domestic financial stability will
likely drive more extraterritorial efforts, not less.
13



Finally, to the extent that the interests of such governments do and always will
diverge quite substantially, banks will find themselves performing duties that
detract from their ability to compete on the “level playing fields” of which they
so often dream.
This is perhaps a gloomy note on which to conclude, though I would hope it is

realistic. One consolation, however, is that this complex model of international
finance, with all its vicissitudes, contradictions and seemingly counterproductive
unilateralism, merely reflects what has been evolving in the domestic and global
arenas of business themselves, as well as in the realm of international relations.
Essentially, such complexity and contradiction is an unexpected consequence of a
world both connected and unglued by technology, a world that is at once both much
closer together and further apart.
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